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19691

PROPERTY TAX

in the instant case represent a step - albeit a small one - in the
right direction. One can only ponder the character and scope of
the Court's next movement.
JOHN M. DRAIN, JR.

TAXATION -

REAL PROPERTY -

ASSESSMENT BY

UNIFORM RULE

State ex rel. Park Investment Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals,
16 Ohio St. 2d 85, 242 N.E.2d 887 (1968).
State governments have long sought to attain the elusive goal
of uniformity and equality in property tax assessment. Ohio has
attempted to achieve this goal by establishing constitutional and
statutory requirements with which the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA)
must comply.' However, until recent judicial interpretation led to
a more definitive answer, the precise scope of the uniformity requirement in Ohio was an open question. In 1966, Goldberg v.
Board of Tax Revision2 gave a partial answer by firmly articulating
the principle that uniformity must be met within the county without regard to property classification.3 It was assumed that the
county was the taxing district and that county-to-county variations
in the assessment rate would be permissible. However, in its last
pronouncement on the subject, the Supreme Court of Ohio held in

State ex rel. Park Investment Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals4 (Park
1 The BTA is a division of the Department of Taxation. OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 5703.02 (Page 1953) [hereinafter cited as COD)]. It exercises vast authority with
respect to determining tax assessments and valuations and has the power to correct
any discriminatory valuations that are brought to its attention. Id. at § 5717.03. In
addition, the BTA has the responsibility to adjust any inequities that it discovers on its
own initiative. Id. at § 5715.24.
2 7 Ohio St. 2d 139, 218 N.E.2d 723 (1966).
3 The basic classifications of property used in Ohio are agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, and vacant land. BTA I. 5-05 (Baldwin 1969). The divisions
are logical, but their usefulness has been obscured since Goldberg. The BTA rules suggest that such classifications indeed serve useful functions; however, the question of
whether they may be used apparently has been answered in the negative.
The purpose of the classifications is to permit local assessors to consider a number
of factors when evaluating the worth of a parcel of land. For example, the availability
of nearby parking facilities certainly should be considered when assessing the value of
commercial property, but it has no relevance when working with the value of agricultural lands.

4 16 Ohio S. 2d 85, 242 N.E.2d 887 (1968).
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II) that the Ohio constitution and statutes require that uniform
rates be applied throughout the state.
Park Investment Company, a commercial taxpayer, brought a
mandamus action against the BTA asserting that the Board continually failed to comply with the state's statutory mandate 5 since it
neglected to assess property within the state at a uniform percentage of its true value in money.6 To illustrate the failure, Park submitted sales ratio studies7 indicating that throughout the state all
property was being assessed at an average rate of 38.78 percent of
its true value,8 while Park's property in Cuyahoga County was assessed at 42.9 percent of its true value.9 In granting the writ of
mandamus, the court considered more than Park's right to the writ
and held that the duty of the BTA was to provide not only countywide uniformity within the same class of property, but also uniformity between the counties.10
The rubrics for the BTA to follow in assessing property arise
from constitutional and statutory sources. The Ohio constitution
and statutes provide an obscure standard. The relevant provision of
the Ohio constitution states that "land and improvements thereon
shall be taxed by uniform rule according to value."" In assigning
the BTA's duties, the Ohio statutes require that taxable value 2
shall be such "that every class of real property shall be listed and
valued for taxation by an equal and uniform rule.""a It is also provided that upon finding an overvaluation or undervaluation of any
class in any county, the BTA shall have the power to increase or de5 CODE § 5715.24 (Page Supp. 1968).
6 16 Ohio St. 2d at 85, 242 N.E.2d at 888. The Cuyahoga County Auditor, Ralph
J. Perk, primarily responsible for the assessment, was also named as a party defendant.
7 Sales ratios are computed by adding actual sales prices of a given number of parcels, then comparing this total to the parcels' total assessed value.
8 It should be noted that the figure of 38.78 percent is based on 1962 studies. Park
also presented ratio studies for Cuyahoga County which were compiled in 1965. 16
Ohio St. 2d at 85, 242 N.E.2d at 888.
9 Brief for Respondent BTA at 5, State ex rel. Park Inv. Co. 16 Ohio St. 2d 85,
242 N.E.2d 887 (1968).
10 For a description of the authority under which the BTA may take remedial action, see note 1 supra.
11 OHIo CONST. art. XII, § 2.
12
Taxable value is computed as follows: First, the property is assessed at its actual
worth on the market, considering all relevant factors, then the assessment percentage
is applied to this figure giving a taxable value. To the taxable value is applied the
millage (10 mills = 1 percent) for both state and local taxation. Taxable value in
Ohio may not be more than 50 percent of actual value. CODE § 5715.01 (Page Supp.
1968).
13 Id. at § 5713.01 (Page Supp. 1968).
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crease the aggregate value of such a class in order to meet the statutory requirements.'
Uniformity and equality in tax assessment is also required by
the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution. However,
the equal protection required by this amendment is not violated unless there is a grossly inequitable deviation from a uniform rule.
The United States Supreme Court, recognizing the need for practical uniformity, has not required exact equality with regard to
all property assessments.1 5 In fact, because of an apparent need for
flexibility in assessment mechanisms, the Court has been reluctant
to enter this area unless there has been patently obvious discrimination caused by an intentional or arbitrary rule of the state or one of
its agencies. 16
Additional limitations on the BTA come from Ohio Supreme
Court decisions interpreting statutes related to the Board's duties.
In a series of cases, the court has refined the definition of uniformity and what the BTA's duties are with respect to the implementation of this standard. It may well be that the recent Park II case
has supplied the key to this definition with regard to the degree of
uniformity which the court will require.
In the earlier Park 117 proceeding, the court held that the BTA
has a statutory duty to review the assessments within any county, and
if it finds discrepancies existing as a whole or as to the various classes
of property it must equalize them. The court held, therefore, that
"[a]ll property, whether commercial, residential or vacant, must be
assessed on the basis of the same uniform percentage of actual
value."' 8
It is clear from Park I that there can be no differentiation between various classes of property. It is not dear, however, whether
a differentiation between counties in rate of assessment is permissible. While the court did not expressly hold that there is a statewide uniformity requirement in Park I, it did speak in terms of rela-

14Id. at § 5715.24 (Page Supp. 1968).

'15 Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1945).
'6 See Souix City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
17 State ex rel. Park Inv. Co. v. BTA, 175 Ohio St. 410, 195 N.E.2d 908, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 818 (1964). After this decision the BTA directed the Cuyahoga County
Auditor to reduce all commercal and industrial property by an aggregate of 15 percent
in order to have a uniform rule. Park's property had been assessed at 80 percent of its
true value which was then reduced to 42.9 percent. Brief for Respondent BTA at 5.
18 175 Ohio St. at 413, 195 N.E.2d at 911 (1964).
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tive uniformity throughout the state."9 In a later effort to clarify
this concept, the court held that all property regardless of class be
assessed at one value.2 ° Again, the court failed to address itself to
whether statewide uniformity was required. Thus, although prior
cases dearly established that property classification and the resultant variations in assessment rate within a county would no longer
be permitted, the permissibility of county-to-county variations remained unresolved. 2 '
Park II arose upon a demurrer to a petition for a writ of mandamus; thus, the question presented was essentially procedural.
Simply stated, the issue was whether Park Investment stated a cause
of action in its petition. Both of the respondents' briefs deal extensively with this question almost to the exclusion of the substantive
issue. 22 Nevertheless, the supreme court chose instead to define the
duty of the BTA:
The question which this case presents is: Do sections 5715.01 and
5715.24, Revised Code, and Section 2 of Article XII of the Ohio
Constitution and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, require statewide uniformity in assessment of real property for taxation ?23

By thus formulating the question and expressly answering in the af-

firmative, it appears that the court now considers statewide uniformity to be both a constitutional and a statutory requirement.
The court's choice of Park II as a vehicle to reach such a conclusion is unfortunate. The issues presented were essentially proce19 Id.
20 Koblenz v. Board of Rev., 5 Ohio St. 2d 214, 215 N.E.2d 384 (1966).
21 Goldberg v. Board of Rev., 7 Ohio St. 2d 139, 218 N.E.2d 723 (1966), another
Cuyahoga County case, was consolidated with Koblenz and then reappealed individually on the question of whether the BTA had acted as the court instructed in Koblenz.
The BTA continued to differentiate between classes of property, but the court reemphasized the principle that such differentiation was not allowed. The companion case of
Frederick Bldg. Co. v. Board of Rev., 7 Ohio St. 2d 142, 218 N.E.2d 724 (1966), was
also reversed per curiam, citing Goldberg.
22
Both the brief for the BTA and the brief for Cuyahoga County Auditor Ralph
J. Perk were specifically directed toward the question of whether there was an adequate
remedy at law which Park must pursue. It was asserted in both briefs that section
5715.19 of the Code afforded Park relief, and, thus, it was improper to maintain an
equitable action for mandamus. Brief for Respondent BTA at 4-5; brief for Respondent Perk at 7, 16 Ohio St. 2d 85, 242 N.E.2d 887. In the brief for respondent Perk,
only slight mention was made of the substantive question. "It would appear that the
key to the solution of assessment problems, therefore, is a uniform percentage to be
applied to each and every parcel ....
Perhaps this is a matter for legislative consid'eration .... " Id. at 11.
23 16 Ohio St. 2d at 86, 242 N.E.2d at 888. Phelps Realty Co. v. Board of Rev., 16
Ohio St. 2d 83, 243 N.E.2d 97 (1968), decided the same day, also held that the Board
had a duty to access at a statewide uniform rate and cited Park I.
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dural and, as a result, the litigants primarily directed their arguments to the procedural questions. Thus it was without benefit of
full argument that the court rendered its decision on the substantive
issue of statewide uniformity. Further, the court's two-page per
curiam opinion is insufficient to fully delineate the basis for the decision.24 In view of the debate generated by the issue, it would appear that the court's decision to require statewide uniformity was
25
worthy of more comprehensive discussion than the court gave it.
An issue unresolved by the court concerns the result likely to
flow from the loss of revenue caused by statewide uniformity. A
rather immediate consequence is that revenues will have to be
equalized by the alteration of valuation. For example, assume that
Franklin County has an assessment of 45 percent and that its budget is based on this percentage.2 6 Then the BTA, under the new
requirements, finds that the average rate throughout the state is 38
percent and accordingly applies this to Franklin County. The
county has now lost 7 percent of its assessment which is the equivalent of a 15.6 percent decrease in revenue. This can be made up
by higher valuations on the property, but such action goes against
An alternative is
the true value concept set forth in the statutes.
to increase the millage rate on each piece of property. However, this
would require a very significant increase in the millage rate. Considering that all increases in the millage rate must be submitted to
voter approval2 8 and that there have been considerable difficulties in
passing any increase of this nature in Ohio, i.e., the recent failure of
local school levies, the perils of relying upon such an alternative are
obvious.
Whether statewide uniformity is desirable depends upon the individual state, its goals, and its overall concept of taxing symmetry.
2
4 In 1964, the Supreme Court of Minnesota was faced with a similar problem. In
a 15-page well-substantiated opinion, the court explained why statewide uniformity was
required and deferred implementation of the matter to the legislature. Dulton Realty,
Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 132 N.W.2d 394 (1964). In another similar situation, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals, recognizing that immediate compliance was impossible,
held that there must be compliance within approximately one year. Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. Ct.App. 1965).
25 See The Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Feb. 2, 1969, at 1, col. 5.
26 After the assessment has been made on the property, this figure is then used for
applying the millage for both state and local taxation. OHio TAXATION 28 (C. Glander ed. 1967).
27
This would be contrary to the recent holding of the supreme court that the
old practice of allowing a plus or minus 10 percent variation in valuation is prima
fade discriminatory. Frederick Bldg. Co. v. Board of Rev., 13 Ohio St. 2d 59, 233
N.E.2d 594 (1968). See generally OHIO TAXATION, supra note 26, at 25.
28 CoDE § 5705.07 (Page 1953).
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Only 27 states require such uniformity. 9 Others allow flexibility
among counties or have a detailed taxing system.3 ° In Ohio there
is a need for some measure of flexibility in the allocation of the tax
burden among counties. 31 This need is reflected by the fact that
Ohio is beset with large differentiations in population size and the
amount of required governmental services between the northern
industrial counties and the predominantly rural areas of the south.
The theory of statewide uniformity is premised upon the belief
that mere variances in location caused by invisible and arbitrarily
drawn county lines are not valid reasons for applying different tax
percentages. However, the unique distribution of population and
industry in Ohio suggests a need for flexibility in tax assessment
which contrasts sharply with the reasons underlying the uniformity
rationale. In fact, rather than applying a uniform rate of assessment as required by Park II, Ohio could well benefit from a much
different plan of real property taxation. Such a plan need not entail varying percentages from county to county, but instead it could
be implemented by applying a detailed statewide system of different
percentages for different classes of property. "2 Such a system exists in other states"3 and a similar one could be provided for in
Ohio. But, it appears that this would require a complete legislative reappraisal of the system of property taxation with subsequent
revision of the tax statutes currently in force.
29 A survey of 49 states (not including Ohio) indicates that 27 have a uniform rate
of taxation. Sixteen states have these rates locally set. Six states have a uniform rate
which is very detailed with respect to classifications. These are Arizona, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, and West Virginia. See CCH STATE & LOCAL TAX
SERV. 5 20-200-20-964 (1968).
30 For an example of this detailed plan, see note 32 infra.
31 For state tax purposes, a county which is basically rural and does not need great
financial aid from the state government will still have to contribute the same amount,
under statewide uniformity, as will a county that is largely urban and is a considerable
expense to the state. The "deeper pocket" theory of taxation would indicate that equality is achieved by taxing more heavily those counties which use the state's services than
those which do not. To an extent, this would cut down on the inherent regressive nature of the property tax. However, one of the biggest problems with local taxation is
the multi-county school districts. It would seem that some equalization must be attained to solve the problem. See Note, Inequality in Tax Assessments - Multi-County
School Districts Add New Emphasis to an Old Problem, 11 S.D.L. REV. 119 (1966).
32
Arizona has adopted such a system of detailed classification and assessment.
There are four class divisions. Class 1 contains railroads, mines, etc., which are taxed
at 60 percent. Class 2 contains utilities which are taxed at 40 percent. Class 3 contains all commercial and industrial property not covered in 1 and 2 and is taxed at 25
percent. Class 4 contains personal residences and agricultural areas and is taxed at 18
percent. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-136 (1968).
33
See KY. REv. STAT. § 136.120 (1968); MJNN. STAT. ANN. § 273.13 (1969);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 84-301, -302 (1966).
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The alternative to a legislative overhaul of the system is for the
BTA to take the initiative in implementing a standard complete
with some built-in measure of flexibility. The question, then, becomes whether the BTA can operate under the mandate of Park II
and attain flexibility. Section 5713.01 of the Ohio Revised Code
requires "that every class of real property shall be listed and valued
for taxation by an equal and uniform rule."3 4 An analysis of this
provision suggests two possible means by which flexibility might be
achieved. 35 It may be effectuated either by altering the aggregate
values of property or by changing the percentage assessment within
a county. Since Park II has expressly eliminated the possibility of
any changes in the percentage of assessment, the BTA is limited to
the alteration of aggregate values of property. Admittedly the
BTA has the discretion to manipulate aggregate values to meet the
statutory requirements of uniformity and equality, 6 and in the past
the courts have not disturbed the BTA's exercise of discretion unless there has been patent abuse thereof.aT However, in light of
the present concept of uniformity as seen in the court's ultimate resolution of the assessment percentage issue in Park II, it would seem
that any attempt to achieve flexibility by such value manipulation
would be proscribed. In fact, the Park II court's articulation of
statewide uniformity in rate of assessment could be iriterpreted to
mean that any idea of flexibility in the allocation of the tax burden
has been rejected. Therefore, legislative action is apparently the
only avenue by which flexibility may be achieved.
Even if strict uniformity is desirable for Ohio's system of real
property taxation, a further question is raised as to the propriety of
the judiciary establishing the standard. The entire subject of uniformity is in need of much study, and the legislature, with its factfinding facilities, would seem best suited for the task. Given the
Ohio Supreme Court's decision that uniformity is constitutionally
required, the court still could have implemented its determination
§ 5713.01 (Page Supp. 1968).
The pertinent part of CODE § 5713.01 (Page Supp. 1968) is:
[The auditor) may increase or decrease the value of any lot or parcel of real
estate in any township, municipal corporation, or other taxing district by an
amount which will cause all real property on the tax list to be assessed at its
taxable value, or he may increase or decrease the aggregate value of the real
property... by a percent or amount which will place such property on the
tax list at its taxable value so that every class
of real property shall be listed
and valued for taxation by an equal and uniform rule.
36
See text accompanying note 14 supra.
37
E.g., Benedict v. Board of Rev., 170 Ohio St. 62, 162 N.E.2d 479 (1959);
American Steel & Wire Co. v. Board of Rev., 139 Ohio St. 338, 40 N.E.2d 426 (1942).
34 CODE
35
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by seeking legislative guidance. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court, faced with a similar problem in Dulton Realty, Inc. v.
State, 8 was convinced that "inequality between counties is as much
a violation of constitutional requirements as is inequality within a
county"" and held that statewide uniformity was required. However, rather than simply announcing its decision and remaining silent with regard to the problem's practical solution, the Dulton
court sought legislative guidance by deferring to the legislature for
implementation of its decision. By contrast, the Ohio Supreme
Court's action thrusts upon the BTA the burden of devising and
promulgating a scheme which conforms to the court's mandate. At
the same time, however, the court has severely limited the alternatives the BTA may utilize in implementing such a standard. "So
as the BTA wrestles with its problems, county auditors and taxpayers can hold their breath. Only the seven judges of the Ohio Su40
preme Court seem unruffled by all the trouble they have caused.
JACK
38 270 Minn. 1, 132 N.W.2d 394 (1964).
39 Id. at 10, 132 N.W.2d at 406.
40 The Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Feb. 2, 1969, at 16, col. 8.
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